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Summary 
The responsibility to protect is a controversial principle and has been ever 
since it was introduced by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty in 2001. Unanimously adopted by the United Nations 
member states in 2005 the principle seemed to be a new way of protecting 
humanitarian values. To protect the citizens of states when the states 
themselves are unwilling or unable to do so.  
 
This study explores the meaning and use of responsibility to protect in 
regard to the situation for Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar (also known as 
Burma) and if the principle consists obligations for the international 
community. The study addresses the exposed situation for Rohingya 
Muslims in Myanmar and how it can be related to the principle. This have 
been proven to be problematic due to the fact that the responsibility to 
protect is soft-law and not legally binding for member states. The 
international community, through the UN, have been monitoring the 
situation for a long time and have called upon reactions. 
 
In order to use the principle in the situation for Rohingya Muslims in 
Myanmar the international community must take the monitoring one step 
further and agree on how to intervene. To investigate whether the 
responsibility to protect can be used in the situation is not a legal obligation 
for the international community even though it can be seen as a moral 
obligation. The principle’s applicability depends on if the international 
community decides to discuss it.  
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Sammanfattning 
Principen om skyldigheten att skydda är kontroversiell och har varit det 
sedan International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
introducerade principen. Principen antogs enhälligt av Förenta Nationernas 
medlemsstater 2005 och verkade vara ett nytt sätt att skydda medmänskliga 
värden. Principen om skyldigheten att skydda används för att skydda 
befolkningen inom stater där staterna själva är ovilliga eller oförmögna att 
göra detta.  
 
Denna uppsats undersöker meningen och användningen av principen i 
relation till den rådande situationen för rohingyamuslimer i Myanmar (även 
kallat Burma) och ifall principen medför förpliktelser för det internationella 
samfundet. Detta visar sig vara problematiskt då principen inte är tvingande 
för medlemsstaterna i Förenta Nationerna. Det internationella samfundet har 
genom Förenta Nationerna övervakat och utrett situationen för 
rohingyamuslimer i Myanmar under en lång tid. De har även påkallat 
reaktioner.  
 
För att kunna använda principen om skyldighet att skydda i situationen för 
rohingyamuslimer i Myanmar så måste det internationella samfundet ta sitt 
övervakande och utredande ett steg längre. De måste gemensamt bestämma 
om hur de ska intervenera. Att utreda ifall principen ska användas i 
situationen eller inte är inte en juridisk skyldighet för det internationella 
samfundet, det kan dock ses som en moralisk skyldighet. Om principen är 
tillämplig eller inte beror på om det internationella samfundet väljer att 
diskutera denna princip som en lösning och vad de kommer fram till i den 
diskussionen.  
 3 
Abbreviations 
ICISS  International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty 
 
R2P Responsibility to Protect 
 
SC Security Council 
 
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
UN United Nations 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Right now, the Muslim minority Rohingya in Myanmar (also known as 
Burma) is subject to violations of human rights and needs help. For the time 
being, international statutory and voluntary organisations are working for 
solutions on the conflict in Myanmar.1 There are land areas in Myanmar 
which are nearly impossible to regulate due to the conflict between state 
sovereignty and human rights.2 States have a responsibility to protect their 
inhabitants3 and when they fail to do so the international community (used 
to refer to a broad group of people and governments of the world) and the 
United Nations (UN) feel that the responsibility passes on to them. The need 
to protect humans from violations of human rights have resulted in several 
reports from the UN and one of them coined the expression “responsibility 
to protect” (R2P).4  
  
External military intervention for human protection is controversial. 
Violations of human rights in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo made people 
raise their voices. Kofi Annan, a former Secretary General of the UN, made 
complaints year 2000 to the international community regarding the reactions 
towards violations of human rights and the right to intervene. He questioned 
how the issues should be approached, since humanitarian intervention is an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty. The Canadian Government responded 
by establishing the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS).5 The ICISS wanted to create a wider understanding for 
the reconciling between human rights and states sovereignty. This resulted 
in the concept R2P which is practical protection for ordinary people, at risk 
                                               
1 GA, A/72/382, Situation of human rights in Myanmar**, 2017, p. 3, p. 7.  
2 HRC, A/HRC/37/70, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar***, 2018, p. 2, p. 8. 
3 GA, A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 2005, p. 30.  
4 Ibid. p. 30. 
5 ICISS, The Responsibility To Protect, 2001, p. VII. 
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for their lives, because their states are either unwilling or unable to help 
them.6 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if there is a legal obligation for 
the international community to intervene in Myanmar in order to protect the 
Rohingya Muslims.  
 
1.3 Question 
The two main questions of the study are:  
• Is the doctrine of responsibility to protect applicable to the present 
situation for Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar? 
• If such is the case, what obligations would the responsibility to 
protect doctrine imply for the international community in relation to 
the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar? 
 
1.4 Limitation 
R2P constitutes a broad and comprehensive subject and limitations have 
been made in this study. The focus in this study will be on the responsibility 
for the international community to react. Therefore, not an investigation on 
the element to prevent, which is also a part of R2P. Neither a deeper 
research into what type of crime the Myanmar government might expose its 
population to. Instead focusing on obligations that the doctrine contains and 
investigating if it’s applicable in the situation for Rohingya Muslims in 
Myanmar. This limitation has been done because an investigation of what 
type of crime Rohingyas are exposed to is a big topic and don’t need to be 
                                               
6 ICISS, The Responsibility To Protect, 2001, p. 11. 
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determined to answer my questions. Nevertheless a brief explanation of the 
different crimes will be presented in order to understand R2P.  
 
1.5 Method and Material 
In order to pursue the research questions and fulfil the purpose the R2P 
doctrine will be investigated from an international perspective. By using 
legal method in international law7 international conventions; international 
custom; general principles; and judicial decisions at the highest level will be 
studied. These are stated in article 38(1) in the Statute of The International 
Court of Justice and constitute international law. The principle of R2P is 
described using these sources, focusing on international custom due to the 
fact that R2P is soft-law and therefore not legally binding.8 International 
custom mainly involves opinion juris, a subjective obligation where a state 
accepts international custom as law9 and international state custom. The 
application to the situation in Myanmar will be investigated through other 
international primary sources as UN resolutions and reports. I have also 
relied heavily upon secondary sources as the ICISS report which is 
fundamental to the R2P principle.  
 
UN is an international organization made up of 193 member states and was 
founded in 1945.10 The organization is widely recognized and the 
resolutions, reports and other UN documents that have been used in this 
study are discussed and created by many of the member states together. 
Therefore, the documents give different opinions and views of the situation 
in Myanmar and the use of R2P. UN is not a state and has an agenda of 
creating peace and security for everyone. It can be hard to transform that 
agenda to reality and to get deeper in how UN and the international 
                                               
7 Cryer, 2011, p. 34 ff. 
8 ”UN General Assembly”, Association for the Prevention of Torture, <https://apt.ch/en/un-
general-assembly/>, visited 2018-04-21. 
9 Linderfalk, 2012, p. 28f.   
10 ”Overview”, United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/>, 
visited 2018-05-03. 
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community actually can intervene. Views from other persons, as professors 
of international law and Myanmar authorities are included in this study. In 
that way, an insight in opinions other than the ones from the organization, 
states and persons that adopted R2P is presented. 
 
1.6 Outline 
The following chapter investigates the situation in Myanmar, with R2P in 
mind. The third chapter will explore the concept of R2P and the possible 
obligations for the international community. It starts with a background of 
international law and the established principles in the UN Charter which are 
connected to R2P. It’s followed by a deeper investigation in R2P focusing 
on how R2P is formulated and how it can be and has been interpreted. 
Chapter four will analyse and discuss the subject matter of the study and 
answer the questions.  
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2 The situation in Myanmar 
Myanmar (also known as Burma) is one of the most ethnically diverse 
countries in Asia. Eight major national ethnic groups are recognized in The 
Citizenship Law of 1982. These have been broken down into 135 
recognized “national ethnic groups”. In Myanmar an estimated 90 per cent 
of the population are Buddhists, 4 per cent Muslims, 4 per cent Christians 
and under 2 per cents Hindus. Rohingya Muslims represent the largest 
group of Muslims in the country and the majority lives in Rakhine which is 
a part of Myanmar. They identify themselves as a distinct ethnic group with 
their own language and culture and claim connection to Rakhine state. 
Successive governments in Myanmar have rejected these claims and the 
Rohingya were not included in the list of recognized national ethnic groups. 
Most of them are stateless.11  
 
The military seized power in Myanmar 1962 and thereafter ethnic minorities 
were progressively excluded from positions of authority and restrictions 
towards minority language and religious freedom were made. The military 
remained powerful through decades but in 2011 the government embarked 
on reforms which resulted in a civilian government. Although, the military 
still has 25 per cent of the seats in the Parliament and has veto on any 
constitutional amendment. The oppression against minorities has continued 
and in May 2015, 700 000 of the minority individuals in different 
communities were disenfranchised.12 By withdrawing temporary identity 
certificates the stateless minorities in Rakhine couldn’t confirm their legal 
residence in Myanmar. Before the election 2015, temporary certificate 
holders were prevented from participating in political life which violates the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) article 21 stating free and 
equivalent voting in genuine elections.13  
                                               
11 GA, A/HRC/32/18, Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities 
in Myanmar*, 2016, p. 2f.  
12 Ibid. p. 2f.  
13 Ibid. p.11.  
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There are long-standing conflicts between Rohingya Muslims (population of 
approximately 1 million) and Rakhine Buddhists (population of 
approximately 2 million) but also between each group on the one hand and 
the Bamar-majority-led central government on the other. Bamar Muslims 
are, unlike Rohingya, a recognized ethnic group in Myanmar. Many 
Rakhine Buddhists are viewing the Rohingya Muslims as illegal immigrants 
with no cultural, religious or social links to Myanmar.14  
 
2.1 United Nations and Myanmar 
Myanmar is a party to key international treaties as Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Convention 
on Rights of the Child. The State is also a signatory to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which means that 
Myanmar authorities have to refrain from actions contrary to the object and 
purpose of the Covenant. Obligations under above mentioned treaties are 
complemented by customary international law and these include rights 
described in the UDHR. The Rohingya Muslims are frequently portrayed as 
a “threat to race and religion” and their vulnerability has increased since 
2012. Extremists and ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups expose Rohingya 
and other Muslims to religious intolerance and encourage hatred that in 
certain cases have resulted in violence.15  
 
Article 2 of the UDHR establishes that states shall protect human rights of 
all, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status. In the Convention on the Rights of Child article 30 states 
that children have the right of belonging to minorities and to enjoy their own 
culture, profess and practise their own religion and to use their own 
language. Systematic violations of above mentioned rights have resulted in 
                                               
14 A/HRC/32/18, 2016, p. 2f. 
15 Ibid, p. 3, p. 5. 
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irregular migration flows of Rohingya from Rakhine State to Thailand and 
Malaysia at the same time as irregular immigrants from Bangladesh.16 A 
peak of 31 000 Rohingya and Bangladeshis are believed to have departed in 
the first half of 2015.17  
 
2.1.1 Special Rapporteur 
Every year, the UN examines and discusses the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar. In annual reports from the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-
General, it can be read that the situation is debated and has been for years. 
In Resolution 1992/58 the Commission on Human Rights decided to 
nominate a Special Rapporteur to establish direct contacts with the 
government and people of Myanmar. The reason of this was to examine the 
situation of human rights within the country. The Commission urged the 
government of Myanmar to ensure free access for the Special Rapporteur to 
any person in the country who is appropriate to meet within his mandate.18  
 
Since Resolution 1992/58 was adopted the Special Rapporteur has written a 
report of the situation in Myanmar every year and a drastic change can be 
seen in the different reports. In the report from 2013 the Special Rapporteur 
Tomás Ojea Quintana visited the Rakhine State where he met State 
authorities and community leaders. He expressed thanks to the government 
of Myanmar for its cooperation.19 In December 2017 the Government of 
Myanmar denied the Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee all access to the 
country which was a change in cooperation from earlier years, especially 
2013. Since May 2016, the Government has not permitted international 
access to the non-government controlled areas and from December 2017 no 
access was permitted to Government controlled areas either.20 In a report 
                                               
16 A/HRC/32/18, 2016, p. 3.  
17 UNHCR, Mixed Maritime Movements in South-East Asia, 2015, p. 2. 
18 UNCHR, Resolution 1992/58, Situation of Human rights in Myanmar, 1992, p. 1f. 
19 HRC, A/HRC/22/58, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana***, 2013, p. 3. 
20 A/HRC/37/70, 2018, p. 2, p. 8.  
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from the SC from September 2017, the president of the meeting, Mr. 
Alemu, expresses his deep concern regarding the fact that the UN and non-
governmental partners are not granted immediate and safe access to all 
affected communities.21 Other participants at the meeting expressed their 
views at the situation, United Kingdom’s representative Mr. Allen said:   
 
They can choose to end the violence, protect civilians and defend 
human rights. They can choose to allow humanitarian access, 
including by the United Nations. (…) But should they fail to do 
so, they will find themselves on the wrong side of history, and the 
Council must then be ready to take further action. 22 
 
Many of the participants brought up the attacks carried out against the 
Myanmar security forces and civilians in northern Rakhine state since 25th 
of August 2017. Arkan Rohingya Salvation Army launched attacks on an 
army base which cost 59 armed attackers lives along with 10 police officers, 
one immigration officer and one solider.23 Myanmar military and security 
forces responded with “clearance operations” and within the first two weeks 
270 000 refugees fled to Bangladesh.24 Reports, satellite images from non-
government organizations, media and sources within Myanmar founded that 
security operations on heavy attacks continued until November 2017.25 The 
high-commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, has 
characterized these crimes as a “textbook case of ethnic cleansing” and 
expressed “we cannot ignore the massive violations of human rights that 
may constitute crimes against humanity”26. He called on the Government to 
                                               
21 SC, S/PV.8060, 2017, p. 3. 
22 Ibid. p. 5.  
23 A/HRC/37/70, p. 10. 
24 ”Bangladesh: Refugee camp capacity exhausted; thousands in makeshift shelters”, 
UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/9/59b24a074/bangladesh-refugee-
camp-capacity-exhausted-thousands-makeshift-shelters.html>, published 2017-09-08, 
visited 2018-04-26  
25 A/HRC/37/70, p. 10. 
26 S/PV.8060, 2017, p. 12. 
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stop claiming that the Rohingya are “setting fire to their own homes” and 
accused them for denying reality.27 
 
Several of the reports from the Special Rapporteurs include similar 
recommendations addressed to the Government of Myanmar. 
Recommendations like develop programme of legislative reform to bring 
Myanmar’s legal system into line with international human rights, protect 
the rights of the entire population28 and to ease the discriminatory 
restrictions on the freedom of movement of Muslim populations29. Yanghee 
Lee called for the urgent adoption of “a strongly worded resolution of the 
UN Security Council on the Myanmar crisis” in October 2017.30 
 
2.1.2 Reactions from Myanmar 
Myanmar’s state chancellor Aung San Suu Kyi is very well-published. She 
won the Nobel peace prize in 199131. In an interview with BBC News, 
where she was asked about the situation for Rohingya Muslims within 
Myanmar, she denies ethnical cleansing. Suu Kyi meant that the expression 
“ethnical cleansing” is too strong and described the situation as “a lot of 
hostilities” and emphasises that Muslims are killing Muslims as well.32 
 
Military matters are left to the army according to Myanmar’s constitution33 
and they have veto on any constitutional amendment. Suu Kyi underlines 
this as a problem because the army is to decide when they want to go in and 
                                               
27 Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, ”Opening statement to the 36th session of the Human Rights 
Council”,<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2204
4&LangID=E>, visited 2018-04-27.  
28 A/HRC/37/70, p. 15.  
29 GA, A/HRC/25/64, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana*, 2014, p. 20. 
30 ”Myanmar: UN Security Council must act on Rohingya crisis - UN expert”, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22307&LangI
D=E>, visited 2018-05-04. 
31 ”All Nobel Peace Prizes”, <https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/>, 
visited 2018-05-03. 
32 “How Aung San Suu Kyi sees the Rohingya crisis”, BBC News, 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42824778>, published 2018-01-28, visited 2018-
05-04. 
33 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter 1 article 20(a). 
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fight and they are working for a change in the constitution on this matter.34 
Suu Kyi commented the heavy attacks that occurred in the second half of 
2017 in a speech and said that the government since then have been making 
every effort to restore peace and stability and to promote harmony between 
the Muslim and the Rakhine communities. According to Suu Kyi there had 
been no clearance operations since 5th of September 2017.35 Not in 
conformity with reports from non-governmental organizations in 
Myanmar.36 
 
                                               
34 “How Aung San Suu Kyi sees the Rohingya crisis”, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-42824778>, published 2018-01-28, visited 2018-05-04. 
35 ”Aung San Suu Kyi 2017 FULL International Speech on the Violence in Myanmar”, 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcksU4G4Nzw>, published 2017-09-19, visited 2018-
05-08. 
36 See 2.1.1. 
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3 Responsibility to Protect 
This chapter will explore the concept of R2P and the basic principles within 
international law. These principles need to be described in order to 
understand the doctrine of R2P.  
 
3.1 State sovereignty 
State sovereignty is established in the UN Charter article 2(1) and implies 
that all states are equally sovereign under international law. All states have 
the capacity to make authoritative decisions regarding resources and people 
within their territory. A corresponding obligation to respect every other 
state’s sovereignty is a condition connected to state sovereignty. Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter enshrines the norm of non-intervention. This means that 
every other state has a duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state. If states violate that duty, the victim state has the right to 
defend its territorial integrity and political independence.37  
 
3.2 Human Rights 
The line after the second World War was “never again” and the forming of 
UN Charter began. In the preamble of the UN Charter the member states 
reaffirm, among others, their belief in fundamental human rights and the 
dignity and worth of the human person. They commit to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations developed in treaties and 
other sources can be maintained.38 Myanmar adopted the Charter 1948, only 
two years after the first signing39. The UDHR from 1948 is the core 
document in the history of human rights and Myanmar was one of the first 
                                               
37 ICISS, 2001, p. 7, p. 12. 
38 UN Charter, preamble. 
39 ”United Nations Treaty Collection”, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I-
2&chapter=1&clang=_en>, visited 2018-04-11. 
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countries to sign the declaration. Later on, in 1966, two Covenants on civil-
political and social-economic-cultural rights, establish the human rights 
norm as a fundamental principle of international relations. Together the 
Declaration and the Covenants opened up for a culture of peace rather than a 
culture of violence.40  
 
3.3 Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention is when a state, or the international community, 
intervene another states territory without the consent of that state. The state 
being intervened is not able or not willing to protect its population.41 
Humanitarian intervention is closely linked to R2P. The ICISS report is 
about the right to humanitarian intervention and if it’s ever appropriate for 
states to take military action against another state with the purpose of 
protecting people at risk.42 
 
3.4 The principle 
3.4.1 Background 
In the ICISS report state sovereignty is re-characterized from a sovereignty 
to control to sovereignty as a responsibility. This implies that state 
authorities are responsible for their role of protecting the lives and safety of 
citizens, but it also suggests that the national political authorities are 
responsible for citizens both internally and to the international community 
through the UN. Through this way of interpreting state sovereignty, the 
agents of state are responsible for their actions, both commission and 
omission. This view of state sovereignty is strengthened by the increasing 
                                               
40 ”Myanmar's human rights record matter of 'grave concern,' says Ban”, UN News, 
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/07/305612-myanmars-human-rights-record-matter-
grave-concern-says-ban>, published 2009-07-04, visited 2018-04-11. 
41 Linderfalk, 2012, p. 205. 
42 ICISS, 2001, p. VII 
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impact of human right norms and international discussion of human 
security.43  
 
Military intervention for protection of humans has been controversial both 
when it has happened but also when it has failed to happen. For some it has 
been an overdue internationalization of moral sense and for others it has 
been a breach of state sovereignty. The discussion became more intense 
after the Cold War and the question was if it’s ever appropriate for states to 
take military actions against another state in order to protect people at risk. 
This together with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 1999, made without the 
approval of the SC, marked the start of change within humanitarian 
intervention. Kofi Annan made complaints and reached out for a solution on 
the problem of how to justify a humanitarian intervention when human 
rights are being violated. This led to the concept R2P that ICISS presented 
in their report 2001.44 
 
3.4.2 The concept 
R2P is described as a principle used when human beings are subject to 
serious and irreparable harm. ICISS means that the principle can only be 
invoked when a large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing occurs to human 
beings or is likely to occur. This has been described as a change from the 
right for states to execute humanitarian intervention to an obligation for 
states to react. However, the sovereign state has the primary responsibility 
for protection of the people within the state. ICISS emphasises that the 
fundamental principle of non-intervention in cases described above has to 
give way to the R2P. Yet ICISS points out that the state has to be unable or 
unwilling to act or be the perpetrator themselves, in order for the external 
responsibility to actualize.45   
 
                                               
43 ICISS, 2001, p. 13.  
44 Ibid. p. VII. 
45 Ibid. p. XI-XII. 
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3.4.3 Implementation of the principle 
UN’s former Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon presented the report 
Implementing the responsibility to protect 2009 where he expressed his 
view on the principle. He concurs with the perception of the principle 
described in the General Assembly’s World Summit Outcome which is the 
resolution where the member states adopted R2P. Resolutions adopted by 
the General Assembly are not legally binding for the member states46 and 
are often referred to as “soft-law” standards which means that they are not 
legally binding.47 
 
Specific parts of the ICISS report on formation of R2P were adopted 
unanimously on the World Summit. Consequently, each individual state has 
the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnical cleansing and crimes against humanity and the international 
community should encourage and help states in this matter. Further the 
international community, through the UN, also has the responsibility to use 
diplomatic means in accordance with chapter VI and VIII of the Charter. 
Means to help protect populations from above mentioned crimes. If 
necessary, they are prepared to take actions through the Security Council 
(SC) according with the Charter and chapter VII on a case-by-case basis. 
Chapter VII regulates the use of armed force and military measures.48 
 
Ban Ki-Moon writes in his report that the Summit Outcome is anchored in 
already well-established principles of international law. States have 
obligations to protect its populations under conventional and customary 
international law. He underlines that R2P reinforces the legal obligations in 
conformity with the Charter.49 Gareth Evans who was Co-Chair of the 
                                               
46 ”Generalförsamlingen”, FN-förbundet UNA Sweden, <https://fn.se/vi-gor/vi-utbildar-
och-informerar/fn-info/fn-som-organisation/fn-
systemet/huvudorgan/generalforsamlingen/>, visited 2018-05-03.  
47 ”UN General Assembly”, Association for the Prevention of Torture, 
<https://apt.ch/en/un-general-assembly/>, visited 2018-04-27. 
48 A/RES/60/1, 2005, p. 30. 
49 SC, A/63/677, Implementing the Responsibility to protect Report of the Secretary-
General:, 2009, p. 5.   
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ICISS agrees with Ban Ki-Moons opinion that R2P wasn’t created to 
produce new rules in international relations. He means that R2P can be 
described in moral and political terms as a new international norm with a 
new standard of and guide to behaviour.50 
 
3.4.4 Crimes listed in the principle 
Crimes against humanity occur when the offences listed in article 7 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) are committed in 
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Rape, torture 
and murder are examples of the listed crimes. Crimes against humanity has 
been considered a peremptory norm of international law according to the 
UN and applicable to all states, even though Myanmar is not a party to the 
Rome Statute.51  
 
Genocide is defined in article 2(a) to (e) of the United Nations Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which 
Myanmar is a party to. Genocide is defined as any of in the article listed acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in a part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group. Killing members of the group, causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the groups are two of the listed acts. 
Whether or not States have ratified the Genocide Convention, they are all 
bound because the principle is, according to the International Court of 
Justice, a crime prohibited under international law as general customary 
international law.52 Ethnic cleansing has not been recognized as an 
independent crime under international law. It has been referred to while 
speaking of the violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. A definition can be found in its 
                                               
50 Evans, 2016, p. 915. 
51 ”Crimes Against Humanity”, United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect, <http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-
humanity.html>, visited 2018-05-03. 
52 Ibid.  
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interim report as "… rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using 
force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area."53  
 
3.5 Security Council 
The ICISS suggested in their report that regional organizations should have 
mandate to authorize military interventions, but the UN member states 
decided in the Summit Outcome that the SC is the only department with the 
mandate.54 Discussion about whether the permanent members of the SC 
should be able to use their veto-power in cases of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity was brought up before the 
World Summit.55 The final Summit agreement regarding the veto-power, 
didn’t result in a regulation in these situations and permanent members have 
a powerful negotiation tool and can vote against decisions of R2P.56 
 
Diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means (in accordance with 
chapter VI and VIII), are the first steps that R2P has to be exercised through. 
These measures shall, according to the formulation in the Summit Outcome, 
be channelled through the UN. Diana Amnéus, researcher and teacher in 
international law at Stockholm University, discusses R2P in her doctoral 
thesis. She means that for natural reasons it should be possible for individual 
states to undertake the humanitarian and peaceful measures when they are 
not in violation of international law. Amnéus interprets the formulation that 
states are “prepared” to take military actions (on a case-by-case basis in 
accordance with chapter VII) through the SC as it’s not a duty. States may 
however use force to protect but it shall be achieved collectively through the 
SC. Therefore, she states that it’s a legal right for the SC to protect by 
military means but not a legal obligation in all cases alike.57  
                                               
53 SC, S/1994/674, 1994, p. 16.  
54 A/RES/60/1, 2005, p. 30. 
55 GA, A/59/HLPM/CRP.1i/Rev.2, Revised draft outcome document of the 
High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 submitted by the 
President of the General Assembly, 2005, p. 29. 
56 Bannon, 2006, p.1160.  
57 Amnéus, 2008, p. 201 f. 
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It’s controversial if approval from the SC should be required when decisions 
of R2P are made. Amnéus interpretation that mandate from the SC is 
required is the mainstream perception. Harold Hongju Koh, international 
law professor and scholar, doesn’t share Amnéus opinion and is one of the 
opponents to the mandate of the SC. In his article The War Powers And 
Humanitarian Intervention, he refers to the Kosovo situation where NATO 
intervened without approval from the SC. He believes that “under certain 
highly constrained circumstances, a nation could lawfully use or threaten 
force for genuinely humanitarian purposes, even absent authorization by a 
U.N. Security Council resolution”.58 Furthermore Mr. Honju Koh underlines 
that international law accepts the repeated slaughter of thousands of 
civilians by prohibiting use of force outside the SC. 59  
 
3.6 Use of the principle 
As earlier mentioned resolutions adopted by the SC constitute soft-law and 
is not legally binding for the member states. However, soft-law documents 
can be important within international law. They can be proof of already 
existing law or affect opinio juris which is a subjective obligation were a 
state accepts international custom as law. This can result in new 
international custom which article 38 in the Statute of The International 
Court of Justice states as international law. Extensive acceptance of soft-law 
instruments can tend to legitimize behaviour and make the legality of 
opposing positions harder to sustain.60 
 
 
 
 
                                               
58 Hongju Koh, 2016, p. 1006. 
59 Ibid, p. 1018. 
60 Evans, 2010, p. 122 f. 
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Different examples of R2P in practice can be found. In Resolution 1674 
from 2006, the concept of R2P was referred to for the first time by the SC. 
Reaffirming that it’s the parties to the conflict that bear the primary 
responsibility to ensure the protection of civilians. 61  
 
3.6.1 Libya 
In February 2011 the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 due to the 
violence in Libya. Since Muammar al-Gaddafi began to rule in Libya, 
massive and systematic human rights violations had been reported. Protests 
against the regime in the beginning of 2011 were met with immediate 
violence resistance by the Gaddafi regime.62 Violence against the civilian 
population was committed from the highest level of the Libyan government. 
The SC recalled “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its 
population”63. When the Gaddafi regime failed to comply with the SC 
demands in Resolution 1970 they authorized the use of force for 
humanitarian protection in another Resolution, 1973. This was made 
without consent of the concerned government which was the first time in 
history.64 The SC underlined their responsibility for maintenance of peace 
and security under the UN Charter.65 International community reacted 
“unusually rapid and robust”66, within the same month as the major protests 
started.67 Even though the resolution allowing the use of force was adopted 
unanimously, disagreements existed. Russia and China abstained from the 
voting on Resolution 1973.68 
                                               
61 Amnéus, 2008, p. 211. 
62 Payandeh, 2012, p. 372. 
63 SC, S/RES/1970 (2011), p. 2. 
64 Bellamy & Dunne, 2016, s. 10.   
65 SC, S/RES/1970 (2011), p. 2. 
66 Hehir & Murray, 2013, p. 3. 
67 SC, S/RES/1970, 2011, p. 1. 
68 SC, S/PV.6498, 2011, p. 8, p. 10.   
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3.6.2 Syria 
Protests against the al-Assad regime began in February 2011. Protesters 
were attacked and subjected to brutal violence from the regime. As 
opposition towards the regime grew the violence from the government 
increased. Thousands of people were killed. Members of the SC reacted and 
many of the member states wanted to take actions against the Syrian 
government. Russia reacted differently and stated that the sovereignty of 
Syria had to be respected. 69 
 
In the end of May 2011, a draft resolution70 was adopted by France, 
Germany, Portugal and the UK. It recalled the Syrian government’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens and urged the government to cooperate 
with the Human Rights Council’s investigative mission. The Syrian 
government refused. Five months after the draft resolution, a final draft was 
presented. China and Russia used their veto and the resolution was rejected. 
Attempts continued towards the use of military intervention in regard to 
R2P in Syria, but the SC has never reached an agreement. 71 
 
                                               
69 Zifcak, 2012, p. 73, p. 76. 
70 A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, 2011, p. 1. 
71 Zifcak, 2012, p. 75, p. 77.  
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4 Discussion and Analysis 
Ever since R2P was coined and introduced it has been a term of discussion. 
R2P is based on internal and external responsibility and possibly obligations 
too. Individual states have the responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnical cleansing and crimes against humanity. The 
international community has a responsibility through the UN to use 
diplomatic means and, if necessary, means through the SC. This can imply 
obligations for the international community. To be able to decide whether to 
use R2P for intervention or not, many decisions have to be made.  
 
Considering the delimitation of this study, the specific crime Myanmar 
might expose the Rohingya Muslims to will not be investigated. Focus is on 
the possible obligations R2P can carry out for the international community. 
What has to be done to use R2P in this case is an investigation by the 
international community to see in what way R2P can be used in the 
Myanmar situation. That is the first step and whether it’s an obligation for 
the international community to investigate the applicability of R2P is 
unclear. Adopting resolution on Special Rapporteur and constant visits to 
the country implies that the international community is required to 
investigate if R2P is applicable. On the other hand, the reports may not have 
R2P as underlying interest. The reason can be UN’s general principle of 
peace and security or upholding UN treaties as UDHR. Yet, the 
investigations by the UN in Myanmar may lead to an obligation to react or 
at least to help the Myanmar Government to solve the problem. This 
because the international community have started the process towards a 
solution on the crisis in Myanmar and should therefore at least have a moral 
responsibility to fulfil the process. However, it mustn’t imply that it’s the 
R2P doctrine that has to be used. 
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Due to the fact that R2P constitutes soft-law it’s impossible to implement in 
all cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnical cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We haven’t seen R2P carried out in practice many times and due 
to the fact that several states are against R2P in situations like Libya and 
Syria, it’s hard to mark it as international custom in the present situation. 
Yet, parts of R2P have been repeated, as the investigation of human rights in 
Myanmar by the international community and voting in the SC of 
resolutions on R2P. Example of voting can be seen in the Syria case and 
example of investigation in reports from the UN, where they have brought 
up that they should protect the rights of all inhabitants and that the SC must 
be ready to take further action. These parts can perhaps be seen as steps 
towards considering R2P, in situations where the listed R2P crimes seems to 
occur, as international custom and therefore international law. 
 
By adopting resolution on Special Rapporteur, who visits the country 
regularly and reports from the General Assembly of the situation, can be 
seen as the international community has fulfilled a part of the first step. 
Another part of the same step would be to respect the sovereignty of 
Myanmar and give them chances to solve the situation. State sovereignty is 
a fundamental principle that states take seriously, for example Russia and 
China using their veto in the Syrian conflict. The fact that most of Rohingya 
Muslims are stateless, subject to ostracize and violence by the government 
creates incentive for the international community to examine if crimes 
against humanity, genocide or ethnic cleansing occurs. 
 
This case is different from Libya and Syria where R2P has been used or up 
for discussion. It means that the international community has a new 
dilemma and a new situation to choose side on. Since using R2P is to 
intervene either with diplomatic or military means it’s a decision made 
above and without the Myanmar government’s consent. If the government 
would start to protect their inhabitants, they would never end up in the 
situation were a resolution on R2P can be adopted against their will. R2P 
can perhaps imply, besides the responsibility to protect inhabitants, an 
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opposite side which is an obligation for the states voting in SC. This can be 
seen as an obligation not only to decide whether to intervene or not but also 
to make a statement in the conflict. This statement can be crucial to 
thousands of Rohingya Muslims and since opinions like Mr. Honju Koh’s 
exist, states can be accused for accepting slaughter of civilians. The voting 
can be seen as an obligation, but states can always abstain from voting, like 
China and Russia did in the Libya case which speaks for the opposite. A 
vote for R2P in the Rohingya situation can harm the relation between the 
international community and Myanmar’s government due to the fact that 
State Chancellor Suu Kyi doesn’t share UN’s view on the problem.  
 
When R2P was used in Libya it happened quickly but Rohingya Muslims 
have been exposed for a long time. UN is no longer allowed to get into 
Myanmar and international community has stressed that this can be ethnical 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. The prohibition of access to the 
country can indicate on the use of R2P because it makes the situation more 
severe and inaccessible for the international community. Adopting a 
resolution on R2P with either diplomatic or military means can lead to 
access for the international community again. Or the prohibition will lead to 
awaiting with R2P from the international community because it can lead to 
infected relations with the Myanmar government.  
 
Amnéus perception of “prepared” as an indicator that R2P is not a duty and 
that it’s a legal right for the SC to protect by military means doesn’t mention 
the diplomatic means. To be prepared to use military means to intervene 
through the SC leads to a voting in the SC as earlier mentioned. Yet the 
diplomatic and peaceful means are also stated in the R2P doctrine and could 
be applicable in the Myanmar case. Though it’s hard to use diplomatic 
means while the international community is prohibited from access and 
even harder to help with diplomatic means when the Rohingya Muslims are 
victims of violence. The fact that R2P is soft-law and diplomatic means 
doesn’t imply voting in the SC speaks for that it’s not an obligation to use 
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them. Member states doesn’t need to choose side as they have to when they 
vote and can easier avoid to react.  
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5 Conclusions 
In summary, the study has provided strong evidence of the uncertainties that 
R2P contains. The fact that R2P is soft-law and lack of state custom intends 
that it doesn’t come with obligations for the international community. This 
fact also implies that the principle’s applicability to the situation depends on 
whether the international community discusses R2P as a solution or not. The 
reports and investigations that the UN have made in Myanmar suggests that 
it should be an obligation to investigate R2P, but there is no legal basis. 
Neither a legal basis to use diplomatic means through R2P even though the 
reports and investigations speaks for a moral obligation to take action with 
R2P.  
 
Furthermore, consent is required in the SC to adopt a resolution on military 
means through R2P and the doctrine can therefore be used if the SC can 
agree on it. If the international community can agree on diplomatic means 
they don’t need to vote in the SC. To force the member state to take actions 
through R2P is not an option because the principle doesn’t imply that 
obligation.  
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